

JFK 22
Folder 7

Introduction

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

- 1 -
main heading:
ISSUE I: CUBAN
CONSPIRACY

The attempts of the United States
ASSASSINATE
government to assassinate Cuban premier
Fidel Castro as well as other foreign
leaders during the turbulent decade
of the '1960's shocked and disgusted
the American citizen. When sources
disclosed that the ~~U.S.~~ Government
Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter "CIA")
intentionally solicited and received
the assistance of various members of
organized crime, La Cosa Nostra, in
the furtherance of ~~the~~ such plots, ~~many~~
more outrage prevailed. Civilized
society simply did not and does not
condone such acts as a legitimate

instrument of foreign policy. There

is no excuse.

(9) ~~the~~ effect and influence of these ~~actions~~ ^{no} ~~actions~~ did not stop, ^{however,}

rationalization.

with ~~invoking~~ ^{invoking}

~~the~~ the disdain of the American public and world. ~~There~~ There

assassination attempt gave birth to

the haunting theory that Fidel Castro orchestrated

~~affected~~ the assassination of President ^{defensive}

John F. Kennedy in ~~a~~ retaliation for

the plot on his life.

~~On~~ In its Final Report

published ~~as~~ in April, 1976, the

Senate Select Committee to

Study Governmental Operations

with Respect to Intelligence

Activities (hereinafter "SSC") responded to this theory.

~~(hereinafter "SSC")~~ ~~has provided~~ to
~~the following information that the report is~~
~~the following report and findings in detail,~~
 In this report focused on
 The SSC ~~concluded~~ two

~~United States~~ operations of "CIA"
 (hereinafter ~~referred~~)

the Central Intelligence Agency" which
~~triggered~~ provoked
 may have ~~prompted an action by~~

~~Castro~~ Castro into retaliation. First,

the SSC documented the ~~joint effort~~
 joint effort of the ^{CIA} ~~Agency~~ and
 Organized Crime ~~to~~ to ~~eliminate~~ Castro.

Second, the SSC examined the
 nature and extent of the CIA

AMLASH operation. ~~This final report~~
 The ~~concluded its analysis,~~
 The SSC ~~presented the following~~

~~for the following analysis and~~ ~~findings~~
 with the statement that

~~the following findings~~

~~the~~ "[t]he Committee believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that reason does not reach any final conclusions." ①

~~the~~ analysis an attempt to make
This ~~document~~ is ~~not~~

~~the~~ such conclusions. It is not the
the remainder of this material
purpose of ~~the analysis to detect the~~

~~conflicting viewpoints~~ to minutely review
the details of the CIA-mafia plots or of
the AMLASH operation, ~~the~~

~~purpose~~ to resolve ^{all of} the conflicting

viewpoints of the SSC and the CIA in regard
to the importance of the ^{various} operations, ^{or to subject anyone to ②} ~~the~~ moral tongue-lashing.

this material ^{first} seeks to ~~the~~ present ~~the following~~
~~comprehensive review of the~~

CIA operation AMCLASH and of the

~~the~~ a comprehensive review of the
involvement or potential involvement
of organized crime in the CIA operations
against Castro during 1960-1963. ~~the~~

~~the CIA operation AMCLASH~~ from

this review certain influences and
conclusions are then drawn

concerning the nature, scope, and

~~the~~ ramifications of these
operations.

II BACKGROUND MATERIAL - ^{Relevant} ~~Summary~~ Summary

A. CIA - MAFIA PLOTS

The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the Inspector General as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards. ^③

4 These plots extended from 1960 until ~~late~~ early 1963 and can be divided into ^{two} ~~three~~ steps. ^④ The first step occurred from August, 1960 until

April, 1961, and can best be
termed as ^{Phase I or} the pre-Bay of Pigs

period. ⑤ From April, 1961 until
late 1961 the CIA takes the
position that the plots were dormant. ⑥

In late 1961 the CIA decided to
^{CIA-MAFIA}, then creating Phase II,
renew the **A** plots and kept them
active until late 1962 or early 1963. ⑦

During the initial stage of
Phase I Edwards assigned the
specific task of locating the ^{proper} proper
persons to assassinate Castro to
James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was
Chief of the Operational Support
Division of the Office of Security. ⑧

Both men agreed that O'Connell should

contact

~~O'Connell~~

~~Robert A. Mahen~~, whom the CIA

previously

had previously used in several covert

operations, to recruit the necessary

personnel. ⑦

~~Robert~~ Mahen subsequently contacted

Roselli, ⑩ who in turn recruited

two persons initially known to

O'Connell as "Sam GOLD" and "Joe". ⑪

along with Mahen

O'Connell says he later discovered the

true identities of these persons ~~as~~ to be

Sam Granara and Santo Trafficante,

respectively. ⑫

After meeting ~~at~~ several times

in Miami and deciding upon poison

pills as the method of assassination, the

1967 IG Report contends that

Trappicante made the arrangements for ~~the~~ the assassination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips. He allegedly ~~delivered~~ made to Haranan, Cuba. ⁽¹³⁾ This contact was Juan Orta, a Cuban official who held a position close to Castro. ⁽¹⁴⁾

¹⁹⁶⁷
The "I G Report then states that Roselli passed the pills to Trappicante. ⁽¹⁵⁾
Roselli subsequently told O'Connell that the pills were delivered to Orta in Cuba. ⁽¹⁶⁾ Orta apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable to fulfill any plan. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Orta was no longer in a position to kill

Castro because he had lost his Cuban post. ⁽¹⁸⁾

With Orta unable to perform the syndicate looked elsewhere. Roselli next told O'Connell, sometime during early 1961, that ~~Trappi~~ Trappiante knew a man prominent in the Cuban Cule movement who could accomplish the job. ^{job - Dr.} ~~Dr.~~ Dr. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Manuel Antonio de Verona y Loreda. ⁽¹⁹⁾

After receiving ~~the~~ approval Trappiante approached Verona about assassinating

Castro and reported that Verona

was receptive. ⁽²⁰⁾ The 1967 I G Report

states that O'Connell again distributed pills which eventually reached Verona. ⁽²¹⁾

~~the~~ This activity concluded

the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots.

The 1967 IGR does not document any attempt to actually administer the plots to Castro.

The 1967 IGR relates that after a period of "dormancy" ^{apparent} ⁽²²⁾ Bissell Bissell in approximately November of 1961 directed William Harvey⁽²³⁾ to reactivate

the CIA-mafia plots. ⁽²³⁾ O'Connell

therefore introduced Harvey to Roselli. ⁽²⁴⁾

During this phase the CIA decided against

using Giancana or Trappianni; ~~they~~

~~John~~ instead, a person referred to

as "MACEO" entered the plot as the

person who would ^{help} provide Cuban contacts. ⁽²⁵⁾

In addition, the plots still utilized

the services of Antonio de Verona. ⁽²⁶⁾

plots
~~etc~~
Even though the ~~etc~~ no longer
included Trappanante and Giancana.

the CIA ~~etc~~ admitted that
Roselli most likely kept them informed.

The CIA noted in the 1967 IGR that

"[i]t would be naive to assume that

Roselli did not take the precaution of

informing higher-ups in the syndicate
territory

that he was working in a territory

considered to be the private domain of

someone else in the syndicate." (27)

In June of 1962 Roselli reported
that

to Henry that Verma dispatched

a three man team into Cuba with the

general assignment of recruiting others

to kill ~~etc~~ Castro, and, if the opportunity

arose, to kill him themselves, maybe through

the use of pills. ⁽²⁸⁾ In September of 1962

Roselli
 reported to ~~Harvey~~ Harvey in

Miami that the "medicine" was

reported in place, that the three man

team was safe, and that Verma

was prepared to dispatch another

three man team to infiltrate Castro's

bodyguard. ⁽²⁹⁾ In December, ~~of~~ 1962,

Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much

seemed to be occurring and by ⁽³⁰⁾ February,

1963, Harvey terminated the plots. ⁽³⁰⁾

B. The Las Vegas Wiretap Incident

The 1967 ~~Inter~~ IGR also mentioned an event that occurred during ~~Phase I~~ Phase I of the CIA-mafia plots ^{INSET A} On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a Florida investigator named Edmund DuBois, for placing an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. ⁽³¹⁾

~~Subsequent investigation~~ Subsequent ~~investigation~~ ^{authorized} investigation determined that Robert A. Maken ~~and possibly the wiretap~~ ^{and possibly the wiretap} the surveillance of the subject involved and that Maken probably acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA. ⁽³²⁾

The violation of the wiretap statute

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
B. The has "

which resulted in the first dissemination
of the details of the plot to persons other
than the ones involved in the operations.

INBETA

used during

INBETA A

CIA-mafia plots. On

er 31, 1960, Las Vegas police

arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee
of a Florida investigator named Edmund
DuBois, for placing an electronic
bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. (21)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subsequent ~~investigation~~ ^{authorized}

determined that Robert A. Mather ~~was~~
and possibly the wiretap
the surveillance of the subject involved

and that Mather probably acted on
behalf of Gianessa and the CIA. (32)

The violation of the wiretap statute

placed the case under
~~the~~ federal jurisdiction and
the FBI soon began^{ing} investigation. In
the course of this investigation Mahen
informed the FBI that he ~~was~~^{instituted}
the surveillance ~~in relation to an~~
~~operation with the CIA involving~~
~~general and~~ of CIA efforts to
obtain Cuban intelligence through
the hoodlum element, including
Granada. ⁽²³⁾ In its efforts to prevent
the prosecution of Balletti, ~~John~~
Mahen, and an ^{unidentified} individual known as
J. W. Harrison, the CIA eventually
told the ~~Justice Department~~^{Justice Department} the details of ^{Phase I of} the
CIA-mafia plots to kill Castro.
This can best be ~~related~~ related through

the following [memorandum from ~~the~~
J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General
Ramsey Clark [quoted in part]. (34)]

Blank letterhead memorandum

3-6-67

TO: Attorney General

From: Director, FBI

TOP Secret

[REDACTED] Attorney General Robert Kennedy indicated that a few days prior to [5-9-62] he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Mahen had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying \$150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated ~~the~~ CIA admitted having assisted Mahen in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason ~~the~~ CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Mahen. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon ^{learning} CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Mahen and Giancana with the Department of Justice

he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such ~~action~~ steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Mahon for any violation in which he might become involved.

~~WILLIAM H. HARRIS~~

~~In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap and resulting investigation forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-mafia plots to non-CIA government officials, implicated the~~

^ the Las Vegas writup is that it forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-MAFIA plots to non-CIA

government officials [redacted] and provided
the first [redacted] ^{occasion} for participants to ^{manipulate} [redacted]
the operation to prevent prosecution.

c. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

The next major event related to the CIA-mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maken used his involvement with the CIA to

INSERT AFTER FOOTNOTE 35

The attorney for Mahan, Edmund Reupert

Morgan, informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter the "Committee")

that Mahan contacted him during ~~the~~ the fall of 1966

~~and~~ and said he was going to be

called before the Long Committee in

conjunction with the Morganthau investigation. ^(35a)

Mahan then informed Morgan of the plots

and suggested that any testimony might

necessarily reveal his previous covert

activities with the CIA. ^(35b) Morgan then

contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston,

the General Counsel to the CIA, to

reiterate Mahan's concerns in an ^{apparently successful} effort

to block ~~any~~ ^{any} testimony. ^(35c)

of the matter.

The DOE then state that

Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spoke to the FBI ~~in~~ ~~regard~~ in regard to Roselli. (38)

The SSC report that Roselli again contacted CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Inca's Club in Beverly Hills in 1967. (39) Roselli contacted Harvey, ~~Harvey~~ who was no longer ~~a~~ a CIA employee, to represent him. (40) Harvey subsequently ~~attempted~~

attempted to influence the CIA in

preventing the prosecution. (41) The Justice Department

~~has not~~, however, subsequently

convicted Roselli for a violation of
the anti-gambling laws. (42)

E. DEBUT OF the Retaliation Theory

The genesis of this theory can
be attributed to an interview ~~with~~ that
Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963
with Associated Press reporter Daniel
Harker. In that interview Castro
warned against the United States
"aiding terrorists plane to eliminate
Cuban leaders." He stated, according
to Harker, that United States
leaders would be in danger if
they promoted any attempt to
eliminate the leaders of Cuba.

Editor James J. Rowley who is then

U
ation

notified the FBI. ⁽⁴⁵⁾ ~~_____~~ Morgan

~~_____~~ informed the Committee that

Roselli initially approached her complaining
of excessive FBI surveillance even

since he had been involved in the patriotic

Roselli also informed ~~_____~~ ^{MORGAN} that Castro
had retaliated ~~_____~~ for these plots by ^{ASSASSINATING} President Kennedy. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

AFTER receiving this

~~_____~~

information the FBI decided not to

further investigate the allegation. ⁽⁴⁷⁾

Following the publication of the
Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of
March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where

the ~~_____~~ theory of retaliation first
gained public notoriety, President Johnson
ordered the FBI to investigate the

matter. ⁽⁴⁸⁾ The FBI consequently ~~_____~~

interviewed Edmund Morgan on

March 20, 1967⁽⁴⁹⁾ Morgan informed the

FBI that he represented clients that

were responsible individuals who entered into

a project that they understood to have

high governmental backing and which involved

the assassination of Fidel Castro.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Morgan

then stated that his clients had

reason to suspect that Castro learned

of these plots and killed President Kennedy

in retaliation.⁽⁵¹⁾

~~The SSC next relates that~~
~~the FBI investigation resulting~~
~~President Johnson acquired a personal interest~~
~~in the theory of retaliation and which~~
~~prompted Helms to order the CIA~~
~~Report of~~
~~1967 Inspector General's Report~~⁽⁵²⁾

The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the retaliation theory which prompted CIA Director Richard Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots. (52)

~~An article in the Washington Post~~
~~September 1967, fully reveals the retaliation theory.~~
~~This states:~~

F. 1967 ~~Washington Post~~ IGR

On March 23, 1967 Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on the CIA assassination plots. (53) This report detailed the ~~accounts~~ accounts of various CIA operations against Cuba ~~including~~ including an analysis of the ^{ORGANIZED CRIME} CIA ~~plots~~ plots and the

IGR
AMLASH operation. The ~~AMLASH~~ also

examined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap
incident. In reference to the AMLASH operation with IGR
~~the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap~~ related

~~AMLASH's~~ AMLASH's activities in

Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and

early 1965 where AMLASH was

meeting with Manuel Artume. (54) The

IGR further noted that Rafael

Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer

for Santo Trappiarte, was in

Madrid, Spain 15 March, 1965. (55) Bongo

claimed to be in contact with dissident

Cuban military leaders, including

AMLASH. (56)

NOTE ON
WHAT BECAME
OF THE
RIVER

G.

~~Anderson~~ Anderson Articles

⑥

⑥

In 1971, Anderson once again published information promoting the retaliation theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins [made it to a rooftop before being apprehended] within shooting distance of Castro, that this event occurred in late February or early March, 1963, that Robert Kennedy "at least condoned the CIA-MAFIA plots, and that Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at the Miami Beach Fountainbleu Hotel on March 13, 1961. ⑥

~~this~~ this
is the proper
Cayle.

#

Roselli deportation

the same year that Anderson released additional information on the plots,

In 1971, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in an attempt to prevent information on CIA operations from being disclosed in the ~~event~~ event INS brought deportation proceedings against Roselli. (57)

The SSC stated in ~~its~~ its Interim Report, ^{released in November, 1975,} that the deportation order ^{still} was ~~not being litigated~~ in the process of being litigated. (58)

In August, 1976, authorities discovered Roselli's ~~body~~ butchered body stuffed in an oil drum and floating in Miami's Biscayne Bay. (59)

His colleague in the plot to kill Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death ~~in June, 1975~~ in his home in June, 1975.

I. The Senate Select Committee **To** Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities.

In connection with its mandate to investigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities the SSC "examined the performance of the intelligence agencies in conducting their investigation of the assassination and their relationship to the Warren Commission." (61)

In April, 1976, the SSC published its Final Report (Book II) which in essence faulted the CIA for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the CIA's on-going plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on

the life of the premier, Fidel Castro.

~~2000~~

After reviewing the details of the CIA-MART
plots the SSC stated that "Castro probably
would not have been certain that the CIA
was behind the underworld attempt" and
that ~~it~~ ^{it would have been} unlikely that Castro would
have distinguished the CIA plots with
the underworld from ~~any~~ ^{any} plots ~~by the~~
~~underworld community~~
~~by the underworld~~ sponsored by the Cuban
exile community and not affiliated in
any way with the CIA. (62)

The SSC identified the AMLASH
operation, however, as being "clearly
different" from the underworld plots. (63)

The SSC stated that AMLASH was
in progress at the time of the
assassination, ^{that it} could clearly be traced
to the CIA, and that ~~the~~

~~AMLASH's~~ AMLASH's proposal for
had been endorsed by the CIA
a coup, the initial step being the
assassination of Castro. (64) The

SSC cautioned, however, that it saw
"no evidence that Fidel Castro or others
in the Cuban government plotted President
Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for
U.S. operations against Cuba." (65)

As related in the Introduction
to this ~~report~~ material the SSC did not
reach any conclusions because it
believed additional investigation needed to

occur. (66)

J. The CIA 1977 Inspector General Report (IGR).

Stung by the Senate criticism
and the rippling effect that Book II
caused in the media, the CIA prepared
a comprehensive report in 1977
designed to answer, at least within
the CIA, the critical questions postulated
in the SSC Final Report. ~~Even the~~ ~~Even the~~

1977 IGR laudably recognized ~~the~~
the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow
response to the Warren Commission's
quest for all possible relevant
information. The 1977 IGR
acknowledged this in the following

goes with
other
page.

The 1977 IGR identified ~~the~~ ^a principal theme of Book II as the possibility that Castro retaliated against the United States for attempts on his life and that the CIA operations may have specifically caused any such action by Castro. ⁽¹⁾ In responding to this theory the CIA decided to ~~investigate the same~~ perform the following:

- 1) to conduct a full review of information and operations in the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and
- 2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. ⁽²⁾

The ~~the~~ details of the 1977 IGR are thoroughly ~~completely~~ related in this material because ~~the~~ no source has previously publicly released them.

1. Syndicate Operations

Before analyzing the AMLASH operations the CIA first related new considerations pertaining to the syndicate operations. The IPR refers to a series of articles ^{written by Paul Meckill and} appearing in the New York Daily News in April, 1975. ~~by Paul Meckill~~

these articles
In ~~the~~ ~~series of articles from April 1975~~

• ~~Meckill~~ Meckill described how

Frank Fiorini, now known as Sturgis,

allegedly recruited Marie Loreny

to spy on Castro ⁽¹⁹²⁾ and how Sturgis knew

planned to use him in
Juan Orta and used Orta in planning to

~~conduct~~ a bombing attempt assassination

of Castro. ⁽¹⁹³⁾ ~~Sturgis~~ claimed Meckill ~~states~~

asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operation for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover. ⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ In

another article on June 13, 1976, Melkill related the claim of Marie ~~Loreny~~ Loreny that in the fall of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle in some food or drink of Castro. ⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

The writers of the 1977 IGR were quite concerned with their assertions because Orta's name had ^{publicly} surfaced in connection with

a Castro assassination plot before
the ~~admission of the~~ SSC revelation
of the CIA-organized crime plots and thus
assignment to poison Castro gave to the
the ~~admission of the~~ "official
clue to Castro who may have received kickbacks
from the gambling interests." The possibility that
Orta was involved in ^{assassination} plots other ~~than~~ the
CIA operation ~~which was~~ also attracted
the attention of the CIA.

In reference to Sturgis' allegation
that he had been a hired operator for the CIA
for a decade the 1977 IGR asserted that
"he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban
employees in the Miami area, but had no
direct relationships with the Agency." (197)

IGR ~~has~~
The ~~document~~ recommended that Sturgis,

through
through his gambling activities and relationships
with various casino ~~operators~~ owners,
~~Stargis~~ may quite possibly have known
Orta, and ~~that~~ also raises the question
of whether Stargis may have been a source
of information to Castro regarding Orta's
participation in any assassination plot. (198)

In reference to the Lorenz - Stargis
param pill ~~plot~~ plot the 1977 IOR noted
the similarity of this plot to the '18
October 1960 details in the (199)

~~October 1960 FBI memo, ~~Stargis~~ ~~the~~~~

~~It also acknowledged that Verano may~~

~~have been involved in plots when the CIA~~

~~approached him~~ (200)

~~The tentative conclusion advanced~~
the CIA

~~by the CIA concerning these~~

Castro. ⁽⁷⁸⁾ The plan allegedly involved the use of poison pills concealed in a jar of face cream; the plan failed because the pills dissolved. ⁽⁷⁹⁾ The TGR then mentions the October 18, 1966 FBI memorandum where Sam Giancana referred to the ~~assassination~~ of Castro, his knowledge of a plot to assassinate Castro involving a woman. ⁽⁸⁰⁾ who would drop a pill in some drink or food of Castro. ⁽⁸¹⁾

The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA syndicate operations and that ^{therefore} the syndicate may have been acting independently. ⁽⁸²⁾ ~~secret~~

The CIA also concluded that Antonio de Verona, the Cuban exile leader active in the syndicate operations, may have already been active in plots with the Mafia when the CIA approached him. ⁽⁸²⁾ The CIA cited two FBI memorandums as support. First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report that Verona was one of the Cubans receiving support. ⁽⁸³⁾

The CIA ~~also~~ further acknowledged that although ~~the operation~~ the operation with the Mafia was ~~interrupted~~ suspended after the Bay of Pigs it appeared to

still be in progress when re-activated

in April, 1962. (84)

The IGR summarized its sponsored position concerning non-CIA syndicate operations in the following passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway... [D] In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contributions was also supplying an aura of official sanction (85)

2. AMLASH

The IGR states the SSC suggests that AMLASH ~~was possibly~~

~~was~~ a Castro agent assigned a provocation mission which would then justify

relationship, or, in the alternative, that

AMLASH was a security risk through

which details of the plotting may have

surfaced to Castro thus providing the

impetus for provocation. ^{Additionally, [redacted]} ⁽⁸⁶⁾ ^[redacted]

the IGR with the SSC as holding that in either

Case

~~[redacted]~~ AMLASH should have been

reported to the Warren Commission. ^(P7)

contends

The IGR ~~[redacted]~~ neither theory is

correct ⁽⁸⁸⁾ ~~[redacted]~~ stating

that the relationship between the

CIA and AMLASH before the death

of President Kennedy was so

"insubstantial and inconclusive that

it provided no basis ~~inferred~~ for AMLASH,

to feel that he had any tangible

CIA support for plotting against

Castro. (89)

In support the IGR proceeds to narrate the Agency's understanding of the operation. On August 17, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "[has] no intention [of giving AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this ~~as~~ [as] something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (90)

Headquarters replied the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical elimination mission be given AMLASH/1." (91)

On September 7, 1963 the CIA received the following cable:

From August 29, 1962 until September, 1963 the CIA ~~states~~ states it did not have any contact with AMLASH. (92)

AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. ~~See~~ According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action. (93)

The IGR notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, says it refers to a general commitment concerning how to effect change. (94) The IGR also states that at this point Book II ~~is~~ says "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." (95) The CIA contends that any dispute only exists in the eyes of the SSC. (96)

The IGR next comments

on an interview of Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of U.S. leaders.⁽⁹⁷⁾ The IGR states that the ~~SS~~ Book II implies that AMLASH/, may have reported to Castro what the SSC characterized as assassination plots.⁽⁹⁸⁾

The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/, by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing."⁽⁹⁹⁾

On October 11, 1963 the case officer called headquarters and said that AMLASH/, claimed to have

the necessary people and equipment

to overthrow Castro without ~~the~~

U.S. assistance. ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ On October 29, 1963

Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH,

in Paris. ⁽¹⁰¹⁾ At this meeting the CIA maintains

~~says~~ that Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH's

request for an assassination weapon,

specifically, a high powered rifle

with a telescopic lens. ⁽¹⁰²⁾ The

CIA contends that at this point it

was clear that AMLASH was informed

that there would be no U.S. assistance

until after the fact which is contrary

to the SSC statement in BOOK II

to the effect that it was uncertain

how AMLASH interpreted the put-off

by Fitzgerald. (103)

On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMZASH/1 that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a scope would be included upon request. (104)

On November 20 ~~AMZASH~~ the case officer informed AMZASH that he ~~was~~ would be receiving the meeting he requested. (105)

← summarized the
The IGR ~~concluded in~~
significance of these contacts with
~~disruption of the AMZASH operations~~

AMZASH as related to the contentions
in BOOK II in the following
passage:

(106) This meeting occurred on November 22.

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for linking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. '06

~~AMLASH/1~~
~~has~~ ~~the~~
~~analysis~~

is
he had knowledge
of CIA info
plus reported
to Castro.

See memo
dated 12/2/64

Finally, ~~in~~ in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA ~~was~~ inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information, the IGR observed:

while we can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to re-inforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. C.I.H., too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time. ... The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." (7)

could just
find the bottom
half - not sure what
the top half adds.

K. ~~Recent Anderson Articles~~
Recent Anderson Articles

In September 1976 and October, 1978,
~~October and~~

Anderson again published article

which ~~outlined~~ the propounded the
retaliation theory. (107) In addition,
~~Anderson published~~ For the first

time Anderson publicly revealed that

John Roselli served as his source

for the retaliation theory ~~all~~ in all of the articles
published through the years.

-44a-

The September 7, 1976 article
appearing in the Washington Post contains all
components of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~relation~~ ^{the} theory. This
states:

THE WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, September 7, 1976

C19

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked-up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators, he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination, according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam 'Momo' Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crack-down on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's

III

ISSUE ANALYSIS

A. Preface

The HSCA investigated this ~~subject~~ material to determine what ~~conclusions~~ ~~conclusions~~ can be ascertained concerning the nature, scope, and ~~ramifications~~ ramifications of these operations. In this ~~report~~ report ^{in the following sections,} various issues are presented ~~and~~ ~~subjected~~ subjected to analysis, and then resolved according to ~~the~~ available evidence, ~~probable~~ probable motivations, and ~~the~~ the most logical inferences.

~~In the course of its investigation,~~
~~the HSCA reviewed the documents~~
~~and all material in its~~
~~possession to the various persons~~
~~from numerous governmental sources.~~
~~and operations involved and interviewed~~

To fulfill this process
~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~

numerous governmental sources that
pertained to the persons and operations
relevant to the investigation. ~~the~~

~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~
~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~
~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~

~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~
~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~

~~testimony before the Committee members.~~

~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~

~~the HSCA reviewed material from~~

~~Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal~~

~~Bureau of Investigation, the Department of~~

~~State, the Department of Defense, Bureau~~

~~of the~~

These persons included: ~~John Roselli~~

1. John Roselli - principal in CIA - O.C. operation
2. Santo Trufficante - principal in CIA - O.C. operation
3. Antonio de Verema - principal in CIA - O.C. operation
4. Sam Giannacava - principal in CIA - O.C. operation
5. Robert Mahen - principal in CIA - O.C. operation
6. Michael McLaney -
7. Samuel Benton
8. Norman Rothman
9. John Martino
10. Edward P. Morgan
11. Edward K. Moss
12. Dino Cellini
13. Richard Cain
14. Charles Tourine
15. Rafael ~~REDACTED~~ "Macho" GENEER
16. Evelio Duque Miyar
17. Jorge ~~REDACTED~~ Alonso Pujol
18. Joseph Shimon
19. Angelo Bruno
20. Sam Mannarino
21. Kelly Mannarino
22. Edward Browder
23. Joseph Merola
24. Arthur Balletti
25. Dominick Bartone
26. Richard Helms
27. James O'Connell
28. Luis Balbuena Calzadilla
29. AMLASH

need to look
up quasi "blacks"
in their papers

- 30. dd William Alexander Morgan
- 31. ee JUAN ORTA
- 32. ff JACK Anderson
- 33. gg Roxelli attorneys
- 34. h.h. FRANK Sturgis
- 35. i. i. Fidel Castro

Wherever applicable and desirable
~~the HSCA either interviewed~~
 or deposed these persons or ~~had~~ ^{subpoenaed} them to give
 testimony before Committee members.

The government sources ~~to~~ where
 & reviewed material
~~applied~~ the HSCA requested ~~_____~~
 were
~~_____~~

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. Drug Enforcement Agency
4. Department of Defense
5. Department of State
6. ~~Department~~ ^{Department} of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
7. United States Customs Service
8. Immigration and Naturalization Service
9. United States Senate Committee on
 Intelligence
10. ~~United States~~ United States Secret Service
11. Chicago Crime Commission
 United States Sen. S.

12. Chicago Police Department
13. New York Police Department
14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime Bureau, Dade County, Florida
15. ~~former~~ Cuban Government.

In the ~~majority~~ majority of instances review of any material at these ^{Sources} ~~sources~~ and any statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly the CIA-Organized Crime or the AMTASH operations.

~~_____~~ almost all
Further, ~~_____~~ relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA Inspector General Reports. For this reason the following analysis principally represents conclusions derived from

substantively the same as that
information ~~already submitted to~~ which

the SSC and CIA previously ~~considered~~ ^{considered.}
Consequently, ~~the following information~~
The HSCA investigation ~~revealed the~~

~~conclusion that~~ ~~and further documentation~~

resulted in additional corroboration of

~~the reliability~~ of this information
a diversity of sources
from ~~primary sources~~ 108

What remains to be drawn are the conclusions.

~~Findings are the
conclusions of the Committee.~~

~~about the
evidence
which
shows~~

ISSUES Pertaining to the B. AMLASH OPERATION

The Committee found no evidence that the AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.

The Committee has ~~not received~~ equally persuasive ~~evidence~~ received ~~from the~~ ~~sources~~ ~~which~~ ~~they~~ ~~therefore~~ cannot state evidence and ~~is not in a position to~~

~~whether~~ whether the AMLASH operation prior to the death of President Kennedy can be characterized as an assassination plot.

Richard Helms, the former Director

(S) -52-

in his testimony
of the CIA, ~~testified to the fact that~~
~~the CIA~~ before this Committee
stated that the AMELASH operation
was not designed to be an assassination
plot. ¹⁰⁸⁵ ~~Already indicated,~~ ^{concluded}
The 1977 ~~IGR~~ ~~concluded~~
that AMELASH had "no factual basis
for lending or reporting any actual
CIA plot directed against Castro"
during President Kennedy's life. ¹⁰⁸⁶

~~Consequently, the CIA~~

~~has not yet been offered~~

~~by Joseph Langosch~~

Joseph Langosch, the Chief of
Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special
the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government
of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services,
Affairs Staff in 1963, offered a
contrasting view to the testimony of

Mn Helms and the assertions of the
^{108c} Desmond Fitzgerald
1977 IGR. ~~The Special Affairs Staff~~

~~He~~ headed the Special Affairs Staff which
was responsible for the AMLOSH operation. ^{108d}

~~Longosch~~

In an affidavit to the Committee

Longosch recalled that:

[F] he AMLOSH operation prior
to the assassination of President
Kennedy was characterized by
the Special Affairs Staff,
Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and
other senior CIA officers as
an assassination operation
initiated and sponsored by
the CIA. ^{108e}

Longosch further recalled that as of

1962 it was highly possible that the

Cuban Intelligence Service was aware

of AMLOSH and its association

with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMZASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA official, including Desmond Fitzgerald. ~~108F~~

In response to Langosch's sworn statements, the Committee received the affidavit of Kent L. Pollock from the CIA. Pollock "served as Executive Officer for Desmond Fitzgerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff ... and discussed with him the AMZASH operation as it progressed." Pollock specifically contested the

assertion of Langoch stating:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLAH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLAH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an 'assassination operation'.

Mr. FitzGerald stated in my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup ~~d'etat~~ d'etat often involves loss of life 1089

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLAH operation as an 'assassination operation'; the Case Officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not; never discussed any aspect of the AMLAH operation with Joseph H. Langoch; the Deputy Chief, the other

(25)

-56-

branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AM LASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AM LASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AM LASH rejected the pen with disdain.

108h

Q

Q

~~If the AM LASH operation was~~

~~not an assassination plot prior~~

~~during President Kennedy's death,~~

~~The Committee believes that if~~

~~concerned Castro ~~ascertained~~ the ~~source~~~~

~~between AM LASH and the CIA,~~

~~and that the operation was not an ASSASSINATION plot during President Kennedy's life, that this discovery would not have~~

(H), 57'

Assuming that AM LASH was
not an assassination plot during the
life of President Kennedy, ^{& that} ~~the Committee~~
~~believes that even if Castro uncovered~~
the Committee believes that
its existence and scope, ^{Castro} would not
have been provoked in a manner sufficient
as persuading President Kennedy
to ~~assassinate~~ induce ~~retaliation in~~
retaliation.
~~the form of assassination~~

Assuming that AM LASH was
an assassination plot ~~and that~~
during the life of President Kennedy
and that Castro uncovered its
existence and scope, the Committee
still believes that Castro would
not have ^{resorted to assassinating the} ~~assassinated the~~
President of the United States in

retaliation.

~~In interview~~

~~The reasons supporting this contention~~
~~are~~

In his interview with the
Committee Premier Castro ~~stated~~ ~~the~~ set forth some

reasons supporting this contention. ~~stating~~

The Committee agrees with the ^{reasoning} ~~logic~~ in
~~First~~ his statements. Castro said in part:

In response to the delegates that

the Cuban government orchestrated the
said:

assassination Castro ~~stated~~

But -
also address
the article

That was insane. From the ideological
point of view it was insane. And
from the political point of view, it was
a tremendous insanity. I am

going to tell you here that nobody,
nobody ever had the idea of
such things. What would it do?

We just tried to defend our folks here,
within our territory. ~~stating~~

Anyone who subscribed to that
idea would have been judged
insane... absolutely sick. Never,

~~#10~~ 591

in twenty years of revolution, I
never heard anyone suggest nor
even speculate about a measure
of that sort, because who could
think of the idea of organizing
the death of the President of
the United States. That would
have been the most perfect
pretext for the United States
to invade our country which
is what I have tried to prevent
for all these years, in every
possible sense. Since the
United States is much more
powerful than we are, what
could we gain from a war
with the United States?
The United States would lose
nothing. The destruction would
have been here.

Castro also added:

I want to tell you that the
death of the leader does not
change the system. It has
never done that.

~~Ques~~ In this interview

Castro also commented on
the speech of September 7, 1963
which has been ~~repeatedly~~
cited throughout the years as an
indication that Castro may have
assassinated President Kennedy in
retaliation. Premier Castro asserted:

So, I said something like those
plots start to set a very bad
precedent, a very serious one --
that that could become a
boomerang against the authors
of those actions ... but I did
not mean to threaten by
that. I did not mean even that.
not in the least .. but rather,
like a warning that we knew;
that we had news about it;
and that to set those precedents
of plotting the assassination
of leaders of other countries
would be a very bad
precedent ... something very

④-61-

negative. And, if at present,
the same would happen under
the same circumstances, I would
have no doubt in saying the
same as I said (then) because
I didn't mean a threat
by ~~it~~ that. I didn't say
it as a threat. I did
not mean by that that
we were going to take
measures - similar measures -
like a retaliation for that. We
never meant that because we
knew that there were plots.
For three years we had known
there were plots against us.
So, the conversation came
about very casually, you
know; but I would say
that all these plots or
attempts were part of the
everyday life.

~~Assassinating Castro~~
Some reasoning, which Committee cautions is speculative, maybe
of some assistance here.

^ It does not seem likely that Castro
would make a veiled reference to assassinating
American leaders in retaliation for

plots on his life if he was actually
 contemplating
 planning such ~~on~~ acts. He would want
 as possible
 to call as little attention to himself
 as possible. Rather, it seems Castro

was attempting to display his public
 and knowledge of
 dismay ~~to~~ such attempts in an
 effort to prevent their continuance.

Consequently, ~~in the absence of~~ together
 with an absence of any other evidence
 implicating Castro in the assassination,

~~the Committee believes that this incident,~~
 the Committee believes that this incident,
~~is not significant.~~

while displaying Castro's displeasure
 at American activities, ~~it does not~~

~~imply~~ does not ~~imply~~
 implicate Castro in the ~~assassination~~
~~assassination.~~ ASSASSINATION.

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

The Committee believes that additional
are ~~_____~~ reasons to
discount any involvement of Castro in
which are also compelling.
the assassination ~~_____~~
The Committee cautions that these reasons, while
persuasive, are still necessarily
~~_____~~ speculative.

First, William Atwood, Special
Adviser to the United States Delegation to
the United Nations, was involved in
diplomatic efforts to establish a
framework for detente during the fall of
1963. Atwood told the SSC that
McGeorge Bundy, an adviser to President
Kennedy, told him that President

(33)

- 64 -

Kennedy was in favor of ^{"pushing"} pushing towards

an opening ~~to~~ toward Cuba "to take

Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps

wrapping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe

getting back to normal." Atwood

also arranged for a French journalist,

Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy

prior to a scheduled trip by Daniel

to see Castro. Daniel and Kennedy

[discussed the prospect for reestablishing

United States - Cuba relations and Kennedy

asked Daniel to see him after visiting Castro.

The Committee believes that

such efforts to establish a peaceful

co-existence between the United States

and Cuba would be ^{hindered} ~~impeded~~ any

desire by Castro to assassinate

Kennedy.

Second,

The Committee also believes that among the ~~of all the United States~~ leaders of

the United States President Kennedy ~~and~~

~~the Administration~~

supported a less hostile attitude

and position toward Cuba. ^{(P) - skip 4 spaces} Then,

^{renewed diplomatic relations} with the prospects of ~~detente~~ in the

air and the knowledge that Kennedy

possessed a more ~~for~~ favorable attitude

toward Cuba than other military or

political leaders, Castro would have

had ~~every~~ reason to hope that Kennedy,

maintained the Presidency. Even if Castro

the relations between Cuba and the

felt ~~conditions were bad with~~

United States were bad under the Kennedy

Presidency,

~~Administrators~~, then ~~there~~ ^{were legitimate} reasons

to suspect they would have been worse

under any other Administration.

(BAd) 66-

Further, the Committee does not believe that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily have ^{favorably} altered the United States' operations and has toward Cuba. In addition, the Committee does not believe Castro would have ~~acted~~ given the United States the ~~occasion to~~ ~~not~~ destroy Cuba if assassinated President Kennedy became such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth it.

B. Issues Pertaining to the CIA-Organized Crime Plots

1. Scope and Nature of Plots - Analysis

a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Sponsorship

James O'Connell ~~was~~ informed the Committee that Mahen told Roselli he represented an international group of clients who had ~~a~~ vested interest in Cuba. ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Mahen told him from the beginning that O'Connell was with the CIA. ⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Mahen confirmed this account to the SSC. ⁽¹¹¹⁾ Mahen also stated in a deposition to the Committee that Giancana knew at the time that ^{Further,} O'Connell was with the CIA. ⁽¹¹²⁾ Trafficante testified to the Committee that Roselli informed him that he, Roselli, was operating as an agent of the CIA. ⁽¹¹³⁾

The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination plots. ~~was at~~
~~recognition of CIA involvement~~
an early stage. This recognition

of CIA initiation is important because shows that

it ~~was~~ Giancana and Trappiante and their organized crime knowingly became ~~and have been admitted~~ involved with the CIA.

~~and have been admitted~~

a) ~~The Timing of the Introduction of~~
~~Giancana and Trappiante~~

b) ~~Discovery of True Identities~~

~~McClellan 1967 TBR relates~~

~~that O'Connell learned the true~~

~~identity of Sam Giancana~~ the entrance of
Roselli ~~and~~ Giancana
arranged for

and Trappiante into the plots and

introduced them to O'Connell as

"Sam Gold" and "Joe." (114) ~~The 1967~~

~~TBR relates that~~ O'Connell emends

he learned the true identities of

these persons a few months after
the operation was in progress when he or Mahen
saw an article in one of the Sunday
sections of the Miami newspaper. ⁽¹¹⁵⁾ ~~that~~
This article supposedly pertained to
Organized crime in the United States and
~~article~~ contained pictures of top
hoodlums, including Sam Giancana
and Santo Trafficante. ⁽¹¹⁶⁾ In the
1967 IGR O'Connell stated that the
article came ^{the} ~~from~~ ^{in the Miami Times} Parade magazine. ⁽¹¹⁷⁾
Mahen ~~contends~~ ^{also} ~~contends~~ that he did
not know the true identities of Sam
Gold and Joe until this article appeared. ⁽¹¹⁸⁾

~~The SAC searched for contacts~~
~~a search of supplements to all Miami~~

~~The day~~ ^{also} O'Connell stated ^{that} ~~that after~~ this incident ^{"we were} ~~the CIA~~ occurred after the ~~CIA was~~ ^{up to our} ears" in the operation and consequently the CIA decided to progress forward. (119)

The SSC ~~searched for~~ conducted a search of supplements to all Miami newspapers for the requisite time period and could not locate any such article. (120) The Committee consequently searched Parade magazine for ~~a~~ the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of 1962, the years which spanned the entire operation. ~~As of~~ The Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade

published an article entitled, "Our government's crackdown on organized crime," written by JACK Anderson, which contains a listing of the top ten hoodlums in the country as well as ~~several~~ ^{several} photographs, ~~of mobsters,~~

including ~~San to~~ ^{San to} Trafficante. (121) The article ~~focuses~~ focuses on the efforts of Attorney General Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized crime and mentions both Giancana and Trafficante.

Although this Parade article appears

~~_____~~

~~_____~~ to ~~_____~~

O'Connell and Mahan's

correspond with ~~_____~~ description,

it is over one year past the beginning

~~_____~~

~~_____~~

~~_____~~ months of the ~~_____~~ operation.

nine months

Indeed, it occurs ~~after the~~ after the completion of

^ Phase I of the plots. Additionally,

neither the SSC nor the Committee has

discovered any other article pertaining

to organized crime in Parade magazine

or the supplements of any Miami

newspaper for the alleged time period.

It appears O'Connell and Mahan are lying in an attempt to look

for an ex post facto reason for

continuing the operation after the

introduction of two of the top ~~prof~~

organized crime figures in the United States.

Implicit in their contention is that

while the CIA wished to solicit

Criminal

~~organized crime~~ sources to assassinate Castro

it would not knowingly have recruited ~~any~~

~~any figures from the top echelon of organized crime.~~

any figures from the top echelon of organized crime. (122a)

Additionally, O'Connell's statement that

"we were up to our ears in it" is even more

difficult to fathom since the operation

~~was~~ according to the 1967 IGR the

in the fall of 1960

~~operation~~ operation was in its embryonic stage

and no pills were even delivered until

approximately February or March of 1961.

Without additional support the Committee does not believe the

^ contentions of Mahon and O'Connell. ~~and~~

THIS CIA

~~the~~ ~~plot~~ plot to assassinate Castro

was necessarily a highly volatile and

secret operation. Once Roselli introduced

additional contacts into the scene it is

not logical that the CIA would have
expected to verify the identities of ~~_____~~
~~described by them exactly who they were~~

~~dealing with conspiring with~~ ~~_____~~

~~individuals~~ such principals. On the

contrary, it is more believable and more

~~likely~~ probable that the CIA ascertained

the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe"

at an early stage and consciously

progressed forward in the operation

confident that these two persons, in

the words ~~of~~ attributed to Colonel

Sheffield Edwards, were individuals

"tough enough" to handle the job. (122)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c) Roles of Principals

i) Phase One

~~O'Connell~~

Colonel Sheffield Edwards assigned O'Connell the task of finding someone to assassinate Castro. ⁽¹²³⁾ ~~Edwards assigned~~ Edwards & O'Connell both decided to

utilize make as someone to recruit persons to effectuate the operation. ⁽¹²⁴⁾

O'Connell also described his role as

the liaison to the CIA and ~~the~~

confirmed that all reports on

information would proceed through him

to the Agency. ⁽¹²⁵⁾ In addition, O'Connell

said he acted as a "babysitter" to

Roselli; that is, remaining with him

to occupy his time to ensure that

Roselli was fulfilling his role. ⁽¹²⁶⁾ ~~During Phase II of the plot, William Harvey assumed~~

O'Connell's position who was assigned slacker. ^(126c)

There is a discrepancy over who suggested Roselli for the operation, ⁽¹²⁷⁾ but in any event, ~~he~~ was recruited because he had connections with persons who ~~could handle the assignment during both phases of the operation.~~ could handle the assignment. ⁽²⁸⁾ ↓

Conflict arises over the role of Graniana. Roselli informed the SSC that Graniana was only a "back-up" man. ⁽¹²⁹⁾ ~~It should be noted that Graniana was~~ Graniana was murdered four days before Roselli made this statement. Mahen, however, described Graniana as having a key role and characterized his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination." ⁽¹³⁰⁾

Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli

who had knowledge of the plot at
the time, ~~reported~~ stated that
~~Giancana~~ Roselli contacted Giancana
to provide Cuban contacts. ⁽¹³¹⁾ Shimon further
characterized Giancana as only providing
contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante,
and not as an active participant. ⁽¹³²⁾
~~1967 FBI report that Giancana was only a contact, not a participant.~~
~~Rosen T. (132)~~

~~The role of Trafficante, the
only living principal organized crime
figure involved in the plot, is the
major source of conflict.~~

The most sound

~~analysis~~ analysis is that Giancana
solely served as a person Roselli
could approach who ~~also~~ could ~~see~~ then
make the necessary contacts ~~to~~
specifically Santo Trafficante.
into the Cuban domain, Roselli, ~~and~~

who FBI files indicate

~~subordinate of~~

~~represented~~ Giancana's interests in

Las Vegas and was subordinate to him, would

not directly contact the organized

crime boss of the Cuban and Southern

Florida area, ~~in this case Santo~~

~~w/out FIRST contacting~~

~~Trappante. Roselli would contact~~

his superior, Giancana, who would

then ~~make the decision~~ make any

necessary arrangements. \ Both Giancana

and Trappante, being bosses of

two organized crime domains, would

have the means, power, and stature

to arrange for the assassination. ##

~~would not have been proper for Roselli~~

~~to have independently~~ after contacting

Trappicante, who had the ~~needed~~ influence to recruit the necessary personnel to actually perform the assassinations, Giancana probably was not an active participant in the process of passing pills or actually arranging the assassination. ⁽¹³³⁾
~~and recruiting Cubans.~~



The role of Trappicante, the only living major organized crime figure involved in the plot, is a major source of conflict. The 1967 IGR contains several references to Trappicante which characterize his functions. In discussing how ~~the~~ poison pills could be given to Castro it states that "Trappicante ('for, the courier') was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably

of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously

poison Castro. "(134) Later the report states

that "Roselli passed the pills to Trappicante"

and that "Roselli reported to O'Connell

that the pills had been delivered to

Orta in Cuba. "(135) After Orta lost

his position in the Cuban government and

could no longer pass any pills the FOR

says "Roselli told O'Connell that

Trappicante knew of a man high up

in the Cuban exile movement who

might do the job. "(136) Roselli identified

him as Antonio de Venora. (37) ^{The} ~~Below~~

~~All relate that~~

following paragraph further confirms

Trappicante's role:

Trappicante approached Verona and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. Verona is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ship, arms, ~~and~~ and communications equipment. (138)

~~On June 1962, the Committee~~
Trappicante testified in public
~~that Trappicante~~

to the Committee that Roselli asked him ^{solely} to act as an interpreter between the American operators and the Cuban contacts. (139)

Trappicante denied handling or carrying any person pills used in the ~~operation~~

operation. (140) ~~denied~~ ~~recruiting~~ ~~operation~~

~~of Verona, and~~ ^{recruiting} ~~denied~~ ~~operation~~ Osta. (141) (142)

~~Quesada~~

TRAFFICANTE'S

In his Senate testimony Roselli confirmed ~~the~~

role as ^{that of a} translator.

O'Connell, however, informed the Committee that Trappuante was the person in contact with Cubans in Havana. (143)

Graniana partially confirmed this ~~by~~ in the 1967 ~~TOP SECRET~~ by identifying Joe a man "who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there." (144)

O'Connell also confirmed that he was the only CIA conduit and that if the 1967 TOP SECRET states Trappuante "contracted or procured the assassins then it accurately reflects the information the CIA received." (144)

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85-

It is interesting ~~to~~ that the
1975 and 1978 Congressional testimony
of Roselli and Trappiante corroborate
each other but remain contrary to
~~the facts~~ how the principals reported
the facts in ~~the~~ 1967. ~~The weight~~
~~of the~~ evidence ^{strongly} indicates that Trappiante
was not merely an interpreter but
an ~~integral part of the~~ active
participant in passing the poison pills
and in recruiting the potential assassins.
This is important in dramatizing the
deep involvement of organized crime with the
CIA in these plots. One can understand
why Trappiante today wishes to downplay
his role; the facts, however, simply do

NOT support his assertions. ~~or only maintain~~
The Committee believes the CIA IGR.

INSERT B

^{insert B} The Committee also heard testimony from Antonio Verma. Verma stated that he is not aware of any ^{CIA} assassination plots to kill Castro and denied involvement in these operations. Verma is obviously lying. ^{The Committee does not feel, however, that a prosecution for perjury, if (lift this up) possible, would assist the investigation.}

longer involved in the operations. ⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ The

IGR states that Rosell remained

as a prominent figure and worked

directly with the Cuban exile community

and directly on behalf of the CIA." ⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

~~The IGR also reflects that Trafficante~~
~~although the IGR does report that~~

^{Trafficante} was not involved in Phase II, ⁽¹³⁹⁾ ~~it does~~

contains this caution: ~~however~~

Trafficante was one of the principals in Suf Edwards Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, Trafficante was the man who brought Verma into the operation late in Phase One, and Verma was one of the main players in ~~the~~ during Phase Two.

It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept both Granese and Trappiante informed of the operation's progress ~~and~~

D) Delivery of the pills

Neither the 1967 FGR or the SSC pinpoints the date on which O'Connell delivered the pills to ~~Orla~~ ^{Roselli} during Phase One of the plot. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trappiante. ~~the subsequent~~ ^{The subsequent} ~~transfers~~ ^{The subsequent steps} remain a mystery but Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orla in

Cuba in late February or early
March, 1961. (148)

Joseph Shimon informed the
Committee that he and Mahen travelled
together to Miami to the Fortaineau
in ~~mid~~ March, 1961, to witness the
Pallen - Johansson fight. (149)

Once there Mahen informed him of the
plot to assassinate Castro. (150) Shimon also
says ~~he attended a meeting~~ that during
his trip he attended a meeting where
a poisonous liquid to be used in
the assassination was passed. (151)

~~Shimon's version probably~~
Shimon is probably the source for
Anderson's
fact Anderson's column of January, 19,

-TH
81.

1971, which fixes the date of the
passage of the poison at the Fortainbleu
as March, 13, 1961.

In any event, it appears certain
the CIA ~~██████████~~ did not pass any
that ~~██████████~~ plots, poison, or assassination
weapons before February of 1961. The
fall segment of the plots only constituted
a planning stage; no one undertook any
operational activities.

E) LOCATION OF TRAPPUANTE

To supplement the description of
Trappuante as a courier the 1967 IGR
states that "[a]t that time the
gambling casinos were still operating
in Cuba, and Trappuante was making

regular trips between Miami and

Harana in syndicate business (152)

The Committee has obtained some evidence
~~which~~ ~~which~~ ~~which~~ indicates

that Trappante was ^{not} travelling to Cuba
during this period. No records

available to the Committee from INS,

State Department, or the FBI

reflect any travels after February, 1960,
During ~~this~~ time

~~the FBI~~ the FBI maintained physical

surveillance on Trappante during ~~this~~

~~period~~ (53) Trappante testified before

the Committee that he only made

two trips to Cuba after his release
the Trescorria prison

from ~~prison~~ in August, 1959, and

that these trips occurred within

two to three months of this release. (154)

~~73~~
-89-

considering Trafficante's reported top position
in the LA COSA NOSTRA,

Additionally, it seems more reasonable

that Trafficante would send a representative
to Cuba to conduct any business rather
than risk being detained by Castro again.

If Trafficante was actually
travelling between Miami and Havana the
implications are interesting. He was either
willing to risk being detained again or had
~~had~~ acquired assurance from the
Cuban government regarding his safety.

In any event the presence of Trafficante
during ~~the~~ the fall of 1960 in Cuba raises
the possibility of a cozy relationship
between him^{self} and

~~the~~ the Cuban government than

previously believed. Such a relationship
during the period when Trafficante

was scheming to assassinate Castro
invites the theory that Trafficante was
possibly informing the Cuban government
of activities in the Miami area in general
and ~~part~~ of the plots in particular.

In return for such information Trafficante
~~would~~ could ^{have acquired} ~~lost~~ lost gambling
~~as well as~~ as well as
~~his~~ operations ~~and~~ support and a Cuban smuggling
~~operation and~~ ~~operation~~ for the

smuggling of contraband into the
United States. The Committee realizes
the enormous ramifications of such a
theory and cautions that it has
not received any information or
evidence in this regard. In addition,
the ~~available~~ available evidence

indicates Trappiante was not ~~personally~~ travelling between Miami and Havana although the Committee recognizes that Trappiante could ~~to~~ make ~~such~~ such trips and not disrupt his ~~own~~ normal routine in Miami and Tampa thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance.

F) Verora's Other Contacts

As previously related the FBI forwarded to the CIA a memorandum on 21 December 1960 revealing that U.S. racketeers were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum

~~-76-~~

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on 18 January 1961 which associated
Verona with those schemes. ⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

~~At the time of his introduction~~

~~into the plot~~

~~Verona was also the~~

Other sources were also providing
assistance to Verona to conduct anti-
Castro operations. At the time of
his introduction into the CIA -
Organized crime plots the CIA was
funding Verona through the Revolutionary
Democratic Front and the Cuban
Revolutionary Council. ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Verona
informed the Committee that the
purpose of the Council stemmed
from an agreement with the American

government to invade Cuba and
establish democratic control of the
island. (157)

Adding to the support for Verma
were the promotional efforts of Dino
and Eddie Cellini who ^{reportedly} were working
through a Washington, D.C. public
relations firm, Edward K. Moss and
Associates. Moss had previous CIA
associations and was supposedly
acting as a conduit for funds
supplied by the Cellini brothers
with the understanding that this group
would receive privileged treatment
in the Cuba of the future. (158)

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In his testimony before the
Committee Verona also described a
with Jorge Almazo Pujol and Meyer Lansky in
meeting ~~at the home of Meyer Lansky's~~
home
in Miami in the summer of 1960. (159)

Lansky said he had business interest
in Cuba and wanted to help the
Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro,
and by and establish a democratic
government. (160)

~~There~~

The logical inference to be drawn
from ~~these~~ this is that the CIA,
Organized crime, and other persons
interested in removing the Castro
regime all settled ~~on~~ upon de
Verona, probably independently.

29,
95-

as a person who had the potential of
uniting the multitude of exile groups
to overthrow Castro. Additionally,
Verma's reported contacts with
organized crime raises the possibility
that he was involved with them in
a plot to kill Castro before the
evolution of the CIA - organized
crime plots. If this was the case
then Tappan's recruitment of
Verma into the CIA operation would
result in providing official U.S.
sanction to an already existing independent
operation. [The CIA recognized this
in stating "it is possible that Verma
already was involved in independent

~~80-~~

96.

operations with the criminal syndicate when
first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs
in March 1961 to carry out the Castro
assassination. ⁽¹⁶¹⁾ (Footnote to p. 19 TABC 1977 I G)

4, 16,

~~88~~

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G) Introduction OF "JOE" AND "GOLD" AND RELATED Events

~~Organized crime plot~~

The timing of the introduction of Giancana ("gold") and Trafficante ("joe") is important to the analysis of the true role of organized crime in the Castro assassination ~~attempts~~ plots.

This introduction, together with other related events, further suggests the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced.

According to the 1967 IGR, the entrance of Giancana and Roselli occurred during the week of September 25, 1960. (162)

In contrast, the SSC did not assign a ~~precise~~ precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IGR and Mahon's Senate testimony which set the date after November, 1960. (163) The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved in the operation ^{during} ~~in~~ October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, 1960 FBI memorandum which revealed Giancana had told several people of ~~a plot against Castro~~ his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro. (164)

Although there two events ~~cited~~ ^{may}
~~by the GSE~~ which the SSC cites ~~that~~
 support the involvement of Giancana
 during October they also ~~also~~
~~invite~~ invite speculation of independent
 organized crime operations. The October 18,
 1960, FBI memorandum is particularly
 applicable
~~to this~~. This states:

[D]uring a recent conversation with several
 friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was
 to be done away with shortly, said it
 would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana
 said he had already met with the would-be
 assassin on three occasions, the last
 meeting taking place on a boat docked
 at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach.
 Giancana stated everything had been
 perfected for killing Castro and that
 the assassin had arranged with a
 girl, not further described, to drop
 a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro, ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾
~~and also stated~~

- 100 -

Junior ^{according to the}
~~the~~ ^{1967 IGR}
~~the~~ poison pills, which the CIA prepared

at Ganciana's request, were not
ready for delivery until late February
or early March, 1961, ~~according to~~

~~the CIA's report, it~~

is extremely doubtful that Ganciana's

November, 1960, assassination plot was

part of the CIA operation. Rather

it appears that ~~the~~ organized crime

~~had it~~ already had its poison plan

in progress, using a nucleus of Castro,

to accomplish the deed, when the CIA

fortuitously entered the scene.

Organized crime then occupied a

perfect position. If their private

plot ~~was~~ succeeded they then ^{would} possess ~~it~~

~~BB~~

far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA which they could exercise at an ~~the~~ opportune moment. If their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing the directions of the government.

H) ~~Richard~~ RICHARD CAIN

The "assassin" that Giancana refers to in the October 18 memo may have been Richard Scallzytti Cain.

Cain, in connection with the Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program, informed the FBI of his criminal activities and ^{close} associations with Giancana. 166 ~~1956~~ ~~Giancana admitted~~

~~Cain~~ ~~stated~~ ~~infiltrate~~ ~~the~~ ~~Chicago~~ ~~Police~~ ~~Department~~ Cain admitted that he had

and been on his payroll
covertly worked for Giancana while
he was a member of the Chicago Police
Department from 1956 - 1960, director
of a private detective agency from 1960 - 62,
and Chief Investigator for the Cook
County Sheriff's Office from 1962 - 1964.

all of
this should
be in a
footnote.
do not
sync

Cain's superiors dismissed him from
office when Cain went to trial in a
drug case investigation. ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ After 1964
Cain travelled extensively with Giancana
throughout the world and also served
a three year sentence in the Terakana
Federal Penitentiary following a 1969
conviction for conspiracy in the 1963
robbery of Franklin Park Bank. ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ As a
result of this bank robbery Cain became

a target of the TOP Echelon Criminal Enforcement Program. (169)

Early in his career Cain established

~~extensive polygraph and electronic~~

~~surveillance experience~~ a reputation

for experience in sabotage, polygraphs,

and electronic surveillance. (170) Cain

reportedly also was fluent in Italian

and ~~English~~ travelled extensively through Latin America. (171) In 1973 Cain was

slain in gangland fashion in a Chicago

restaurant. (172)

Start in
again ->

Serial of Cain's activities during

the fall of 1960, together with his past

experience, ~~which the suspicion~~

~~that~~ support the proposition that

~~that Cain was involved in any Cuban~~

~~affair~~ ~~Giancana participated in.~~ First,

Cain

if Giancana was involved in any ^{specifically an assassination of Castro independent of the CIA plot,} ^{would have} Cuban affairs, he [^] recruited Cain to assist him.

First, ^{record} ~~Cain~~ Cain maintained a ~~record~~ ^{record} of voluntarily providing information to the CIA ~~on his~~ concerning ~~his~~ his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. In a ~~CIA~~ CIA

memorandum to the FBI dated 4 November 1960 in his first contact with the CIA:

Cain supplied the following information:

- i) ~~Cain informed the CIA that in 1950-52~~ while in Miami, Florida, he installed several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures ~~under~~ under the supervision of William Buenvia, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government.

William Buenvia →

- 

[REDACTED] to the CIA to supply
 this [REDACTED] occurred simultaneously
 [REDACTED] information [REDACTED]
 with [REDACTED]

~~James~~ Giannano's ~~meeting~~ meeting with Roselli and
Carm subsequently ~~contacted the~~
Maken. ~~The the first reason that~~

~~Quinn~~ ~~one~~ ~~contacted~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~ ~~and~~ volunteered information to the CIA during 1961-63.

Second, ^{ON} November², 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Sergio Montego, the former head of the July 26th Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July Movement and former counsel in the United States for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. ⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who wished to get news stories and photographs out of Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ Cain further indicated that he ~~wanted~~ wished to cover this story and was soon going to Miami

in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Matley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Agranian of Life magazine, had knowledge of this venture. (176)

Third, on November 2, 1960, the

FBI interviewed CAIN in miami at the

Sands Hotel, miami beach. (177) Cain said he

was a representative of Accurate Detection

Laboratory, [REDACTED] magazine,

providing information on the military
~~armaments in Cuba~~ ^{178a} Cain said that the

Resistance movement had eight hundred
men fighting in ~~the~~ the Escambray

Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity to parachute into the escambrays

to
~~take~~ take photos for L.I.C. (179) Cain said
that Antonio de Verona ~~gave~~ ^{gave} him the
information on the Cuban armaments. (180)

When

~~the following~~ CAIN is ~~plans~~ ^{plans}

to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps
for former President Prió or to take

are considered photographs ~~of~~ of rebel activity, on both,
presence in Miami and his refusal to ^{the ASSASSINATION}
OF CASTRO 17 November

simultaneously with Giancana's ~~meeting~~

with Roselli and ~~Makes~~ ~~in Miami~~ and

with Cain's approach to the CIA, ~~under~~
the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events become
the ~~underlying~~ ~~elements~~ ~~associated~~ ~~with~~ ~~these~~ ~~events~~ ~~become~~

~~even~~ ^{even} more suspect. The
assignment

wiretap ~~coverage~~ and the photographic

story may ~~be~~ have been covers; Giancana

may have been attempting to send Cain

to Cuba to supervise the poisoning

attempt on Castro. Cain ~~was a member of~~

belonged to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish,
had extensive contacts in Latin America, ~~and~~
was well-versed in sabotage and investigative
procedures, ~~had~~ had been on Giancana's
payroll for four years, and apparently ~~was~~
arrived in ~~by~~ approximately
attempting to ~~go to~~ Cuba in November, 1960. ~~the~~
~~was the individual by Giancana designated by~~
~~Giancana for the assassination. ~~Cuba~~ Further,~~
in his FBI interview
Cain's ~~reference~~ reference to Antonio de
Verona, [~~the person Trappicanto recruited~~
~~to participate in the plot is approximately~~
~~March, 1961, and~~] the person that the CIA
concedes may have ~~already~~ been active in
independent organized crime ^{ASSASSINATION} plots against
Castro prior to his recruitment by
Trappicanto in March, 1961, raises

Department vigorously pursued this

investigation and prepared to indict

~~Ballitti, Maken, and the person known~~

~~As J. W. Harrison~~ the principals, ~~no~~

~~no~~ could determine who Harrison was and
participant

~~no~~ ~~no~~ would admit to ~~his role~~ knowing

his identity. There is no doubt he existed;

he signed the hotel register ^{and} accompanied

Ballitti ^{ON} the flight to Las Vegas, ⁽¹⁸¹⁾ Both DeBois,

the private investigator Maken hired to conduct the

surveillance, and Ballitti maintained that

Maken ~~provided~~ ~~for~~ arranged for J. W.

Harrison to accompany Ballitti from Miami

to Las Vegas to assist in the operation.

Maken denied this. ⁽¹⁸²⁾ O'Connell, the

CIA liaison man, ~~was~~ informed the Committee

that whoever Harrison was he was not
a CIA employee. (183)

Clearly someone arranged for ~~maker~~
Harrison's presence and knows his true identity.

~~Deane~~

Since DuBois and Balletti ~~were~~ acted
only as the instruments ^{of} ~~of~~ ~~maker~~ ~~of~~ ~~Deane~~, and

~~it seems logical that they~~
~~had no knowledge of FIA or CIA operations,~~

it seems logical that they would have revealed
Harrison's identity in the face of federal
prosecution if Harrison were just an employee

of DuBois with no connection to the CIA or
the associates of maker in
to ~~maker's "friends" associates in~~ ~~an~~

CIA operations against Castro. ~~The concept of~~

next
page

~~evidence support and influence support~~
~~the conclusion that maker did provide~~

~~Someone~~ ~~clearly~~ ~~someone~~

Thus, Ballietti And DeBois either did not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client's interests prohibited them from revealing such information.

Clearly someone arranged for Harrison's ^{presence} ~~presence~~ and ~~he~~ ^{knew} his identity. It seems most likely that Maher provided Harrison at the request of a source that ~~had~~ had a direct contact with the surveillance.

~~for Harrison to partake in the surveillance~~

~~the evidence together with the statement of Dan Rowan~~

~~Despite his denial the evidence~~

~~attempts~~
~~and inferences support the conclusion~~

~~that Markham did provide for Harrison to~~
~~the evidence of the surveillance and the identity of Markham~~

~~from the surveillance~~ Markham
~~did not~~

informed the Committee that he instituted

the surveillance to pacify Giancana's

concerns that Phyllis McGuire was having

an affair with Dan Rowan and to

~~also~~ uncover any possible leads

regarding the operation. ^{(184) (mp. 42)} Rowan confirmed

these two accounts in his Senate testimony. ^{(185) p. 79 SIR}

~~In part it is~~

~~A DT is probably correct, in part, partially~~

~~correct that Giancana did request~~

~~Markham to bug Rowan's room. Shimon~~

Shimon further informed the Committee that Giancana [REDACTED] told him he paid \$5,000 for the Las Vegas operation. CI of Shimon p.5 (186)

Assuming that Mahan did provide most likely for Harrison he ~~is all probability~~ did at the request of so ~~for~~ someone else. Mahan did not have any reason to independently prefer one person over another; The CIA ~~and~~ for Giancana, however, did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest obviously stemmed from his

relationship with McGuire and it is probably correct that Giancana requested Mahan to bug Rowan's room. This personal interest could ~~reasonably~~ have

prompted Giancana to direct Mahere

to use ~~one of his~~ a person of

Giancana's choice. Cain fits that

role perfectly. He was ~~in Miami~~ ^{during}

late October and early November, ~~and was~~ ⁱⁿ Miami

~~the~~ ^{was} a skilled electioneer

was the debarkation point for ~~original team~~ ^{on their trip to} Harrison and Balletti ~~in~~ Las Vegas.

surveillance technician, In his deposition

Mahere denied any knowledge of Cain. ⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ When

shown ~~a photo~~ several photographs

of CAIN from the late 1950's and early

1960's Arthur Balletti also could not

identify CAIN as Harrison.

⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ These denials do not detract from the theory that CAIN was Harrison; if one would ~~not~~ identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason ~~for~~ to expect any change in testimony.

The CIA had a personal interest because of its surveillance of McGuire ~~because of~~

the 18 October 1960 memorandum

where Giancana discussed ~~the~~ an

assassination plot against ^{Castro} the SSC

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this memo caused the CIA
concludes that ~~the~~ CIA ^{to be} ~~was~~ concerned
with determining if Giancana was
leaking information on the CIA-
organized crime plots. This may be
partially correct, but the ~~the October FBI~~
memorandum as already indicated the
FBI memorandum depicts a plot ^{substantially} ~~strongly~~
in progress and involving a girl who does
not resemble the October status of
the CIA operation. The CIA ~~should~~ ^{could} have
been more concerned that Giancana was
involved in a separate assassination plot
and consequently ~~should~~ ^{could} have been
~~more~~ concerned with its
nature and extent. ~~But~~ The reasons
why Phyllis McGuire would ^{have} been the target

for such surveillance ~~was~~ ^{was} two-fold. First, her relationship with Giancana might have dictated a closeness which entailed her knowing of certain clandestine activities. Second, she was one of the "several friends" ^{in the conversation} ~~with which Giancana had~~ ~~the conversation~~ related in the 18 October memo. ⁽¹⁸⁹⁾

The CIA intent would also explain why a wiretap was ~~used~~ installed. Mahan informed the Committee that he ~~could not~~ ^{could} order only ordered physical surveillance of the target, Rosen, and could not understand why anyone ~~pl~~ installed a wiretap since the ^{primary} intent ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~it~~ ~~was~~

to check on McGuire's reported affair
with Rouss. ^{(190) p 40 Can. depo} ~~Physical~~ Physical surveillance
and a room bug would, admittedly,
be more than adequate to uncover
any affair. If, however, Maken also
wished to investigate the possibility
of leaks in the operation as well as
the possibility of Graniana's involvement
in a ^{independent} ~~separate~~ plot, then the use of
a ~~wiretap~~ ^{would have been} ~~is~~ logical.)

~~Therefore, both the C.I.D.~~

~~Graniana had a personal interest in the~~

~~top.~~

~~After the Las Vegas operations~~

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that interesting... affair was not the primary

focus of the Las Vegas operation

~~Assuming~~

It can be argued that

direct surveillance
~~of McGuire~~
of McGuire

would have been

the optimum method to investigate

her

for ~~such~~ leaks and information ^{for} Giannara

may have given her.

~~would have been indirectly surveilled~~. This,

however, would have run the risk of incurring

the wrath of Giannara and his possible

departure from the CIA assassination plots

~~if anyone detected the surveillance.~~

Through the cover of surveilling Rouss for

a possible affair with McGuire, however, the
had the opportunity toCIA ~~could have surveilled~~ may have ~~pos~~~~possibly may have been~~ indirectly surveilled McGuire

to obtain information on the assassination plots

for a reason which met the approval of Giannara.

Indeed, Giannara probably ^{always believed} ~~that~~

that his direction to investigate a possible
affair was the only issue involved in the
surveillance. In any event, the
objections of both Ganesana and the
CIA could have been achieved whether
HARRISON was a Ganesana ~~choice~~ choice,
specifically CHAIN, or ^{an} ~~Agency~~ Agency
operator.

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After the Los Vegas operation back-fired

~~boomeranged~~ the CIA obviously

assassination plots. ~~DDA~~

decided to continue the ~~operations~~. This

~~DDA~~ O'Connell, et al,

indicated that ~~they~~ felt the security

of the ^{CIA} organized crime plots had

not been seriously breached. ^{Additionally,} ~~DDA~~

^{possibly} it indicated that the CIA ~~possibly~~

determined that even if Giancana

was involved in an independent

operation, that it ~~did not~~ would

not hamper their efforts, and that

all intents could be reconciled. The

CIA continued on the same track,

blithely going "to bed" with ~~the~~

~~Mafia~~ organized crime.

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-1166-

I) The "girl" in the 18 October 1960 memorandum.

In this memo Granera spoke of a girl ~~who was about to Castro~~ who ~~was~~ was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. This format is again in contradiction to the CIA operation which initially relied on Juan Ortiz, a secretary in Castro's prime ministry, to administer the pill.

The identity of this 'girl' referred to by Granera has not been ascertained but it is reasonable to assume that Trafficante ~~was~~ ~~was~~ ~~was~~ is the prime position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles. (Consequently,

The use of a girl is quite logical and further supports ~~the~~ the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to Kill Castro

American gamblers routinely maintained Cuban mistresses and Trappinatti was a typical example. A witness also informed the Committee that Castro customarily around at the Nacional Hotel unescorted to visit one of his paramours. ⁽¹⁹¹⁾ Indicates This indicates that it may have been relatively easy for Trappinatti to have arranged for a young woman to serve Castro and to attempt to poison him. Consequently, the use of a girl is quite logical and further supports the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to Kill Castro.

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5) Articles on Frank Sturgis

As indicated in Section II.

Paul McKill of the New York Daily News

wrote several articles in 1975 and 1976

concerning activities of Frank Sturgis.

→ These articles further ^{reflect} ~~support~~ the theory that organized crime was involved in independent Castro

~~assassination of [redacted] plots~~

^{consequently}

The Committee "agrees ~~that~~ with

the CIA assertion that the Agency

"may have been peggy-backing on the

syndicate and, in addition to its

material contributions was also supplying

an aura of official sanction." ~~the~~

~~accordance with this theory the~~

~~Consideration has been formulated~~

~~considerations~~

The following consideration ^{emerge} ~~are~~ from this theory and more ~~study~~ thoroughly respond to the allegations in the mekill articles.

First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassination plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. ~~The~~ Such plots may have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its plans to kill Castro in April, 1962.

Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been directing activities such as those described in the New York

Daily News article.

Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some capacity. This does not ^{imply} that he was a member of organized crime.

Fourth, Frank Sturgis probably knew Ota and could have been involved with him in an assassination plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however,

his allegations are suspect.

According to the Committee's review ^{of all available} evidence,

Fifth, the CIA was not involved in any operations with Ota prior to

late 1960. as ~~determined by~~

Lastly, Sturgis was not necessarily involved with Loreny or Orta in a plot to kill Castro. He may have learned of plots involving Orta and possibly Loreny ~~etc~~ in Miami ~~in 1965~~ after Orta

around there in 1965. ^{Additionally,} ~~It is interestingly,~~

← the ^{April,} 1975, Meskill articles did not ^{relate} ~~contain~~

the Sturgis - Loreny plot to kill

Castro with poison pills. It is only after

the publication of the SSC Interim Report

in November, 1975, and the Final Report ^{describes}

in April, 1976, that Meskill ~~learned~~ this

plot. Thus, Sturgis may have combined

^{accurate} information ^{obtained} ^{from} ~~Orta~~ ^{and} other

Miami sources with the facts the

^{and then} ~~presenting~~ fabricated

SSC presented ~~in fabricating~~ ~~the~~

-11/2- 128

~~that the~~
together with other evidence such as the 18 October
memo,

the LORENZ

a story ~~which appears~~ ^{to be} logical and
which ~~is~~ ^{can} unfortunately
~~be~~ succeed in appearing

both logical and believable.

K) Implications ~~Phase~~ Phase Two of the Operation

Significant differences are apparent between Phase One and Phase Two which reflect ^{upon} ~~the~~ ~~the~~ organized crime's motivation and seriousness in fulfilling its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960.

First, in Phase One, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, in a position close to Castro. In Phase Two the modus operandi and the ability of the assassin or assassins becomes quite vague. Harvey reported that Venona ^{access} had an asset in Cuba who had ~~access~~

- 11/4/7

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to someone in a restaurant which Castro frequented who could administer the poison. (201)

In June 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey that Verma had dispatched a three man team to Cuba to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill him themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity arose. (202)

Harvey said they had no specific plans. (203)

Second, as already indicated, the cast of the organized figures involved changed.

Mareu, Gramana, and Trappuante allegedly retired from the scene, with

a "Macco" assuming the position of
Roselli +

Trappuante. Verma remained. As the

~~CIB concluded it is ^{almost certain} quite probable~~

~~that Roselli kept Trappuante, and probably~~

~~Giannina, informed of the progress of~~

~~the plot.~~

1—The Committee agrees with the CIA that these figures, at least Trappanese and Giannina, were kept informed of the progress of the plots.

What is puzzling is the introduction of a person simply referred to as "Marco" into a highly sensitive and covert CIA operation without any apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his identity.

It seems ~~unbelievable~~ ~~extraordinary~~ ~~that~~ that the CIA would propel the plots forward without performing any security check. Further, although the

Indeed, it seems more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did ascertain the identity of Marco and for whatever reason decided to withhold this information.

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D

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A related issue is whether "phases" actually existed or whether the operations to kill Castro encompassed ~~one~~ a continuous time period. ~~The AS indicated~~ ~~pre~~ previously indicated the CIA maintains that the plot was dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harnrey assumed direction in the Spring of 1962. Both Harnrey and OConnell stated, however, that ~~they~~ took Harnrey "took over a going operation." ~~The exact details of what this ongoing operation entailed has not been divulged, and~~ Considering that Roselli was able to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in response to Harnrey's request and that this

mobilization involved Verma, whom

Traffante recounted in Phase One, it seems

reasonable to assume that some of the

individuals in Phase One were ~~involved~~ actively

after the Bay of Pigs and
attempting to kill Castro ~~during the~~

~~current period, ~~probably~~ at least through~~

~~the summer of 1961~~ until the advent

of Soviet solidification. Their effort,

however, may well have been conducted

without CIA knowledge and again support

the theory of independent organizing crime ^{plots.} ~~efforts~~

~~to kill Castro.~~

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1967 IGR characterizes macco as Roselli's man, it is more probable that Trappiante, who had recruited all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who maintained the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided the individual. If this speculation is accurate, then it displays Trappiante again performing a direct role during Phase II, a function ~~every~~ every source has denied.

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During late 1962 and early 1963
~~Despite the apparent effort~~

~~to kill Castro~~ Phase TWO undramatically and slowly terminated. In retrospect, the ~~very~~ ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential

Assessing, the total reliance of Harvey
on Roselli for any information, and the
seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate
any information from Roselli all converge
to posit the ~~theory~~ theory
that organized crime was not seriously
attempting to assassinate Castro after
following the
~~the theory of Roselli's theory~~ the
solidification of Soviet influence ~~of~~
ⁱⁿ the Castro regime. Trafficante, Lansky,
and other Cuban casino owners must have
realized by the ~~spring~~ 1962 that
the "golden goose" of Havana had
laid its last egg, and that fortunes
were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, history
shows growing Lansky influence in

the Bahamas and Las Vegas, Trafficante
profits in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning
bolita operations in Florida arising from the
influx of Cuban exile. Further, organized
crime ~~may~~ have determined
that the new
Justice Department ~~crackdown~~
probably not have
would ~~not~~ permitted the ~~so~~
"wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy
era even ~~if~~ if
the United States ~~could~~ had succeeded
in ousting the Cuban regime. ~~the~~

As analyzed in the motivation section
of this analysis, however, the organized
crime still had a strong incentive

~~Despite these reasons~~
Consequently, while the United States

government, specifically the CIA, still
possessed a viable interest in assassinating
Castro, organized crime did not.

Despite these reasons to discontinue
attempts to kill Castro, organized crime
still had a strong incentive to
string the CIA along. This incentive,
specifically, this incentive was ~~to~~ to
establish a relationship with the CIA for
subsequent use in thwarting ~~any~~ prosecutions
for unrelated offenses and ~~for~~ ~~in~~ thus
blunting the ^{any} Justice Department ~~ability~~
^{theory}
This ~~theory~~ ~~motivation~~ is more thoroughly
explored and supported in ~~Section III (2)~~.

the following section.

2. MOTIVATION ^{OF} ~~FOR~~ ~~THE~~ ORGANIZED CRIME
TO BE INVOLVED IN PLOTS

Despite the reasons just
presented to discontinue attempts to kill
Castro, organized crime still had strong
incentive to string the CIA along.
Specifically, this incentive was to
establish a relationship with the CIA
for subsequent use in thwarting
prosecution for unrelated offenses and
thus blunting any Justice Department
proceedings against organized crime.

The Committee believes that
organized crime, while ^{always} recognizing the
benefits of establishing a ~~support~~ ~~with~~
relationship with the CIA, ^{initially was} ~~initially~~
also ^{seriously} ~~intending~~ ~~in~~ ^{intending} in assassinating

Castro to regain lost ~~to~~ territory.

As already indicated, the Committee

believes this desire ~~linked~~ with the
And others Factors just mentioned.

solidification of Soviet influence. After

this occurrence it appears ~~that~~ organized

crime may only have put forth

the "appearances" of involvement and good

faith in the plots to further define a

relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the

CIA prevention of prosecution in ^{1961 in} the

Las Vegas ~~murder~~ incident would have

given Mahon, Roulli, and Giancana

confirmation of the value of such a

relationship and impetus for continuing

it in 1962 even though the assassination

Notes to
CIA
Dept
of Justice
1961

of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative.

The actions of Maken, Giuncana, and particularly Roselli in the years following their plots support this

theory. As related in Section II, ^{actually did} ~~these individuals~~ ~~actually did~~

use ~~their~~ their CIA affiliation ^{in attempts} and knowledge of the plots [^] to hinder

law enforcement prosecution and objectives. (204)

~~Their efforts were extremely successful~~
The success of some of their efforts

verifies the tremendous blackmail potential

they possessed. As Sam Rapich, the

FBI liaison to the CIA, commented

in May, 1967, Giuncana and Roselli

had the CIA "on a barrel" because
of "that operation" and he doubted
that the FBI would be able to

do anything about either Granica
or Roselli because of "their previous
activities" with the CIA. ⁽²⁰⁴⁾ It is

clear that at least one group benefited
from the failure of the assassination plots.

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3. Retaliator theory.

The Committee found no evidence that these operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.

The Committee also has found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities or even knew of their existence prior to the death of President Kennedy. Even if Castro did discover their existence, however, the Committee does not believe that Castro would have connected them with the CIA. In this regard, only a few persons knew of CIA sponsorship; the Cuban operators and any others engaged in penetrating Cuba or directly participating in

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the assassination efforts were ^{reportedly} reportedly
told

~~total~~ that United States businessmen

on organized crime sponsored the operation

~~As just indicated in the previous~~
~~section the Committee believes that~~

~~organized crime participated in the~~

~~plot in part to bring the CIA along~~

~~and thus foster a growing relationship~~

~~which subsequently could be exploited~~

~~to prevent prosecutions of the organized~~

~~crime figures involved in the plot. ~~the~~~~

~~Committee determined~~

1 ~~_____~~

In an article - in the Washington Post on September 9, 1976,

Anderson revealed that ex-CIA agent William Harey, attorney Edward P. Morgan, and ~~for~~ reputed mobster John Roselli were his sources. ~~The~~ The Committee has determined that John Roselli was the person who informed Harey & Morgan about the plot and the relaxation theory;

Thus, only one source, John Roselli, actually ~~existed~~ existed. ~~Further~~ Further, John

Roselli supplied all information concerning the operation to the CIA through either James O'Connell or William Harey.

The Committee notes that the ~~dissemination~~ ~~of the relaxation theory~~

~~of the relaxation theory~~ and the dissemination details public dissemination of the ~~fact~~ of

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the plots corresponds remarkably
to the efforts of John Roselli to prevent
his deportation in 1966 and 1971, and
to prevent his prosecution for illegal
gambling activities in 1967. There

circumstances plus other evidence ~~has~~ have
led the Committee to conclude that
~~John Roselli was the mastermind of the~~
John Roselli ~~was the mastermind of the~~
~~plots~~ ^{MANIPULATED} → the part of
the plots ~~into~~ into the retaliation theory
in efforts to force the CIA to
favorably intervene into his legal affairs
to prevent the further disclosure of the
plots in general and the retaliation theory

in particular and to prevent further
waves of public paranoia. The Committee
notes that in some instances John
Roselli was successful.

Even assuming that Castro did

~~ascertain~~ ascertain the existence of the

CIA-organized crime plots and that
and ignoring the Committee belief that Roselli fabricated the
retaliation theory,

the CIA sponsored them, ^{it is unlikely} the

Committee still believes ^{that} Castro

would ~~have~~ have resorted to assassinating

the President of the United States in

retaliation for the reasons indicated

in the ~~AMLSIT~~ AMLSIT portion of

the Issue Analysis section. Specifically,

these reasons are:

1) the ~~project~~ project of exposing Cuba
to ~~total~~ invasion and destruction
would not have been worth the risk;

2) ^{the act of} changing a leader does not necessarily
change the system;

3) Castro may have recognized that among

the leader of the "United States Kennedy maintained the least hostile approach towards Cuba; and

- 4) the growing prospect of détente between Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating a ~~US~~ American official.

4. Related Organized Crime Activities

The Committee found no ^{or indication} evidence from the review of this material that the organized crime figures involved and other persons involved in the plots to kill Castro participated in the assassination of President Kennedy ~~with~~ or without any Cuban assistance.

The Committee received evidence that further raises the possibility ~~that the possibility~~ that various organized crime figures [redacted]

~~involved in the C.R. Organized Crime plots~~

~~may have been involved in these plots or~~
were [redacted]

[redacted] involved in ~~the~~ attempt to assassinate Castro unrelated to the C.R.

~~The Committee investigated~~

~~Norman Rothman~~

To ascertain more information about
 organized crime's knowledge about
 Castro assassination plot the Committee
 investigated Norman Rothman, ~~Rothman~~
~~a Cuban gambling operator who~~
 was active in operating various casinos
 in Cuba before the Castro takeover and
 who consequently maintained associations
 with organized crime and the Batista
 regime. ~~At various times~~
 Rothman ~~operated the~~ served
 as manager of the Sons Souci and
 Capa Cavana Clubs in Cuba representing
 the interests of the Mannarino brothers
 of Pittsburgh. ^{John Mannarino} (106)

~~_____~~
FBI files on Rothman indicate that
a proposal to kill Castro was made to
Rothman as a "quid pro quo" in
which Rothman expected to avoid
imprisonment for ~~his~~^a 1960 gun running
conviction. During an FBI interview
Rothman stated that he had been in
"personal contact with White House
attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as
Assistant Attorney General John
Liegenthaler, both of Washington, D.C." and
Footnote to p. 26
members of the Kennedy Administration.

In a deposition to ~~the~~ the Committee
taken in Miami on April 16, 1978,

Rothman expanded on the theme to include

a series of mysterious telegram
 summoning him to the White House for
 a series of two or three meetings which
 began in Attorney General Kennedy's
 office with members of his staff and
 continued in a conference room where
 Rothman's assistance in providing
 contacts inside Cuba was explored. At
 the last meeting Rothman ~~commented~~ ^{says that:}

~~He~~ "one of them happened to discuss
 [the assassination of Castro] with me,
 but not in a technical way. You
 know, just in a casual way. ~~Later~~
 that is about it. I cannot for the
 moment remember it word for
 word because it is too far back."

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The evidence suggesting such an approach by Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in light of the Justice Department crackdown on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely doubtful that any meeting ^{with Rothman} on this topic would ever ~~have~~ have occurred ~~at the White House~~ at the White House. ^{believes it highly} Consequently, the Committee ~~believes it highly~~ unlikely that ~~believes it highly~~ such events occurred.

The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicates that organized crime ~~may have been~~ may have been aware of the AMTASH operation during its existence.

The 1967 IGR identified some
name links between the AMLASH
operation and ~~organized~~ the organized
crime operation. The IGR did not
~~detail however~~ sufficiently analyze,
however, that the common denominator
in two of the links was Santo Trafficante.

a. Link ONE

In March, 1961, the CIA received
information that a high-ranking
military figure in the Castro regime
and a former personal secretary of
Castro both wished to defect. The
military officer was Rolando Cubela
~~de~~ Secades (AMLASH) and the former

secretary was Juan Orta, the operation used in Phase I of the CIA-organized crime plots. As already indicated, the 1967 IOR ~~study~~ ~~and~~ documents that Trappanite recruited Orta.

The Committee has determined that other than the coincidence of both Orta and AMLESH seeking infiltration at the same time there is nothing to suggest a relationship between the two men in attempting to assassinate Castro, not a common denominator with Trappanite, Roselli, ~~or~~ ~~any~~ ~~one~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~group~~ ~~or~~ ~~any~~ ~~other~~ ~~members~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~American~~ ~~gangster~~ ~~syndicate~~.

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~~as redacted~~

his link is therefore insignificant

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b. Link two

gambling syndicate.

Link Two

In mid-March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a noted Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious position of Minister of Sports in Cuba, contacted CIA station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro" (1967 I.G. Report, p.). It quickly became clear to CIA employees that Bongo's reference was to Cubila and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempting to depose Castro. Although the 1967 and 1977 I.G. Reports are silent as to their attitude toward Bongo's information, it must be assumed that they did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Arttime was in the process of delivering arms caches to Cubela's people within Cuba.

Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency personnel as a lawyer for the Capri Hotel and Casino in Havana who had been jailed in July 1975 for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santo Trafficante. Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August 1959. For the Cuban government to wait for 3 years to exact retribution for that representation makes no sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching the Castro

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as reflected

government in 1962 on Trafficante's behalf for permission
to reopen the Capri casino.

Bongo's trip to Madrid apparently involved more than
a contact with the CIA for he was arrested for counterfeiting
and held until his old client, Santo Trafficante, arrived
with a suitcase full of cash to obtain his release. ~~(See~~
~~interview of FBI SA Wendell Sall. See also deposition of~~
~~Victor Espinosa Hernandez.)~~ Presumably, Bongo was paroled
back to Cuba, at an unspecified later date, where he died.

One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship in
Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is doubtful
that anything more than supposition can result from further
exploration. ^{generally accepted} It has been reported by Jack Anderson that his
private and secret source until his death, John Roselli, had
reason to speculate that Cubans originally recruited by Santo
Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and sent
back to the United States where they were directly involved
in the assassination of President Kennedy. ~~(See Anderson~~
~~column, dated 9-7-76; interview by Fenton and~~
~~, another columnist, George Crile, carried the~~
~~story a step further by suggesting that Trafficante became~~
~~a witting participant in the Cuban Prime Minister's plan of~~
~~retaliation. ()~~ If this line of hypotoca-
tion is adapted then the trip to Madrid by Bongo could assume
some sinister implications such as the possibility that Bongo's
real purpose in contacting ^{CIA in} ~~the~~ Madrid ~~Station~~ was to act as

a double agent for Castro in ascertaining the nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. Castro certainly became aware of the Artime meetings with Cubela in the fall of 1964 since the list of charges upon which Cubela went to trial in 1966 began with these Madrid meetings. If Castro had begun his suspicions of Cubela's role with the CIA during late 1964 or early 1965, it is likely that he would have begun counter-intelligence measures to confirm his fears which could have led to Castro sending Bongo to Spain to contact the Agency. Given Trafficante's close ties to Bongo (~~see also Aleman footnote in AMLASH section~~), it can be postulated that Trafficante was aware of Bongo's true mission prior to his departure or became knowledgeable when he bailed him out of jail in Madrid. (~~Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing whether Bongo stopped in Miami to see Trafficante prior to going to Spain unless we could obtain the case file from Secret Service of the Italian killed in Miami who was supposed to be Bongo's partner according to S/A Wendall Sall.~~)

Trafficante^{also} could have received news of Cubela's ties with the Agency through his close associate Jorge Nobregas who was described by Gorge ~~Celie~~ in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76) as "having worked with the CIA, was in Cubela's student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close to Trafficante."

Actually, given the extent of Trafficante's high-level contacts within the exile community and the low-level security

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in the CIA exile operations, it is extremely logical that Trafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some fashion, part or all of the AMLASH plot. The question becomes: So what? Short of being able to blackmail the government about the modus operandi of the 1960-62 events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily apparent. ~~However, if Trafficante was in fact a double agent, a whole other scenario emerges. Now?~~

One further reference to Bongo surfaced during an interview by Committee Staff with Jose Aleman on March 14, 1977 when Aleman related that Jorge Nobregas introduced Aleman to Trafficante. Santo Trafficante offered to assist Aleman in obtaining a Teamster loan ostensibly out of gratitude for Aleman's relative (Bongo) representing Trafficante in Cuba. Trafficante fully admits the Teamster loan proposal which was to be arranged by Frank Ragano, Trafficante's personal lawyer, who also represented Jimmy Hoffa and Frank Chanez in criminal cases.

Of course, the most relevant aspect of the Trafficante-Aleman meetings in September 1962 to this Committee is the statement attributed to Trafficante by Aleman that "...you don't understand me. Kennedy's not going to make it to the election. He is going to get hit." Aleman reported that the inflammatory prediction occurred during a lengthy diatribe against the Kennedy administration's campaign against Jimmy

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~~+~~
~~+~~

If Trappuante was a double agent,
working for the CIA but actually
supplying information to Castro, then
another scenario emerges. It is then
logical to assume that Castro knew of
the AMTASH ~~plot~~ and CIA-
organized crime operations from their
inception. As mentioned earlier is
this material Trappuante could
have received a sanctuary ^{and} assistance
in smuggling
~~the~~ narcotics contraband ~~smuggling~~

for such information. As also
discussed earlier, however, the
Committee believes that even if
Castro had knowledge of ~~the~~ CIA
sponsorship of plots against his life

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that ~~the United States Government~~
~~by killing~~ this would not have
provoked him to kill President Kennedy.
The benefit of ~~past~~ contemporaneous
knowledge of the plots ~~would be~~ ~~to~~
would be to ~~neutralize~~ neutralize their
effect. Consequently, the Committee
believes that any contacts between
AMLAASH and Somoza ~~are not relevant to~~
~~a situation~~ does not affect the
credibility of the sedition theory.

c. Link thru

contained in the 1967 IGR

The SSC noted that informants¹
from
~~subject~~ "A," Victor Espinosa Hernandez,
~~suspected~~ ~~subject~~ raised the

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possibility that a link existed
between the AMHAST operations
and the 1960-62 CIA plots to
assassinate Castro using underworld
contacts.

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~~INTRODUCTION~~

In its concluding section of the Final Report, Developments After the Warren Commission, the Select Senate Committee to Study Governmental Operation (SSC) speculated that organized crime may have had a continuing knowledge of all CIA operations against Castro during the 1960's.

"The 1967 I.G. Report noted that information given by "A" suggested a link between the AMLASH operation and the 1960-1962 CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. In other words, the information "A" provided raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the assassination plots in which William Harvey participated, may have also been aware of the AMLASH operation."

Start here
now → A review of the 1967 I.G. report does not sustain the Senate's conjecture in that there is no available evidence cited in the Report to suggest that "A" (Victor Spinoso Hernandez) had knowledge of, or involvement with, any of the syndicate or Cuban exiles who participated in Phase I or II of the CIA-Mafia assassination plots during 1960-62. What Book ~~IV~~ did was to seize upon the 1967's tentative identification of ~~"these"~~ "name links" between the 1960-62 ^{organized} ~~gangster~~ operation and AMLASH intrigue, and expand the amorphous nature of those "name links," which included "A," into a theory that "A" was the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA efforts to

eliminate Castro.

The only solid factual basis for Book ~~VI~~'s tie-in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is ~~based upon~~ upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities in June-July 1963, which Book ~~II~~ *examined* *D*

More, CIA files contained at least some FBI reports on "A," the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963. These reports detail his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training camp in New Orleans in July 1963.

The "underworld figures" reference relates to ~~McLaney~~ *Michael* and William McLaney who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnel. (See profile.) Again, however, no evidence from any source places McLaney into the early CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation. A review of the June-July 1963 activities of McLaney and Victor Espinosa leads only to the inference that *their* operation was a private limited venture with no agency or syndicate support and very little chance of success. (See Review of Lake Ponchatrain in McLaney Profile. Footnote re Victor Espinosa.)

Moreover, the link between McLaney, Espinosa and the organized crime principals connected to the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected in order to make a judgement as to the likelihood of ~~Book IV~~ *the SSC*'s speculation that the syndicate held "inside" information on Agency operations in 1960-65.

Since the Senate did not attempt to interview either of the McLaney brothers or Victor Espinosa in 1975 nor ~~in~~ ^{ASIC principals of} ~~quire of the witnesses~~ ^{to} the 1960-62 plots ~~into~~ of their knowledge or relationship to McLaney or Espinosa, the Senate's hypothetical question of underworld knowledge of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a minimum of hard data and a maximum of free-wheeling conjecture.

The evidence linking Espinosa to any known organized crime figures consists of his admission to being friends with "Cappy" Rothman, Norman Rothman's son, and a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned from his student days of visiting the Havana casinos.

Mike McLaney ^{is} ~~is a~~ ~~figure whose~~ ties to organized crime have been ^{seriously} questioned within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid evidence has linked him to Trafficante, Rosselli or Giancana. Since McLaney has been most frequently mentioned as a "Lansky man." To place a witting ^{McLaney} into the 1960-62 plots, it requires a series of major speculative hurdles which include: (a) Myer Lansky was a plotter with Trafficante; (b) McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; ^{and} (c) the various underworld figures acted in concert in promoting anti-Castro operations. ^{The Court has that} None of these premises are easily supportable with facts ^{and consequently do not place any}

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^{significance in the} ~~link~~ Victor Espinosa

link.

indent & separate from main paragraph

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As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered. Sam Giancana was shot in ~~his~~ ^{the} basement of his home in Chicago in June, 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots. ~~John~~ John Roselli's butchered body was found in ~~an oil drum~~ inside an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne Bay, Florida, in ~~which~~ ^{which was shortly} August, 1976, ~~shortly after~~ ^{shortly after} his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA - organized crime plots.

Various theories have surfaced

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concerning why ~~and who~~ they were

killed and who was responsible. One
theory relevant to this investigation
of ~~the more popular theories has been that~~

is

~~that~~ ~~has been~~ that Giancana and

Roelli were killed because of their participation

in the Castro assassination plots and the

SSC attempt to elicit information on the

plots. In that regard Trafficante

has ~~be~~ most often been the person assigned

responsibility for the deaths. On the

other hand, the Justice Department

informed the Committee that it believes

~~the hit or murders were mob~~ that

~~the~~ organized crime performed the murders

and that ~~the~~ the reasons were unrelated

to the CIA-organized crime plots.

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The Justice Department is still investigating both murders. The Committee has not uncovered evidence ~~relating~~ ~~to~~ relevant to solving these murders.

The Committee does believe, however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths. These motivations included

internal ~~mob~~ mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA - organized crime plots. The Committee considers it

highly probable that Trafficante ~~assisted~~ ~~was or decided~~ approved of and assisted of at least in the murders, ~~particularly of~~ John

Roselli. The Committee believes that

Trafficante Trafficante's motivations would

activities were necessarily connected to the assassination of President Kennedy.

The Committee does not believe that such ~~other~~ ~~persons~~ ~~as~~ ~~have~~ ~~been~~ ~~connected~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~assassination~~ ~~of~~ ~~President~~ ~~Kennedy~~

have

been to maintain a low profile

in connection with the CIA plots and

~~to prevent disclosure~~

unknown

to prevent disclosure

of other persons involved in the plots as

well as other operations and activities which

an investigation of the plots might uncover.

For instance, TRAFFICANTS may have

~~had a close relationship with Castro~~

which may

~~entailed~~

entailed

have his

running contraband through Cuba

~~into~~ into the United States.

¶ For reasons already indicated the
Committee does not believe Castro
assassinated President Kennedy.

As a result of ~~concealing~~ ^{this investigation}
~~conduct~~ ^{also has} the Committee found
^{convincing} no evidence ~~or intention~~ that
the organized crime figures and
other persons involved in the
plot to kill Castro participated
in the assassination of President
Kennedy ~~and~~ without any
Cuban assistance

Consequently, although the deaths
of Roselli and Graniana ~~partially~~
~~are related~~ at least are ^{related} partially
~~related~~ to the CIA-organized crime
operations, the Committee does not
believe that they are related to
the assassination of President Kennedy.

IV Conclusions

The Committee makes the following conclusions.

A. AMLASH OPERATION

1. The Committee finds no evidence that the AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
2. The COMMITTEE HAS ~~RECEIVED~~ ~~CONFLICTING EVIDENCE AND~~ ~~THEFORE~~ NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT.
3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES ^{it is highly unlikely that} ~~that~~ CASTRO WOULD ~~have~~ HAVE BEEN

single space
and all
capitals =>

PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT
TO INDUCE ASSASSINATIONS
PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IN RETALIATION.

4. Assuming THAT AMLASH WAS AN
ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE
LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS
EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE
STILL BELIEVES ^{it is unlikely} THAT CASTRO WOULD
~~BE~~ HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN
RETALIATION.

Insert Remarks

B. CIA - ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS

1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED
PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE
PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
2. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF ~~THE~~
~~SPONSOR~~ THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS
DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY,
AND ^{EVEN} IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR
EXISTENCE, THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT

PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT
TO INDUCE ASSASSINATIONS
PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IN RETALIATION.

4. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN
ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE

5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
ANY KNOWLEDGE ^{on the part of} ORGANIZED CRIME
OF THE AMLASH OPERATION OR
ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED
CRIME FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA -
ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH
WOULD NOT ALTER THE CONCLUSION
THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED
IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
Kennedy.

1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE
THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED
PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE
PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.

2. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF ~~CIA~~
~~SPONSOR~~ THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS
DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY,
AND ^{EVEN} IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR
EXISTENCE, THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT

BELIEVE THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE NECESSARILY
CONNECTED THEM WITH THE CIA.

DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT

3. ASSUMING THAT¹ CASTRO DID LEARN
OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS
~~ADDED~~ AND THAT THE CIA WAS
SPONSORING THEM, THE COMMITTEE STILL
BELIEVES^{it is unlikely} THAT CASTRO WOULD ~~BE~~
HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
ORGANIZED CRIME WAS INVOLVED IN
ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO
INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS.

5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY ORGANIZED
CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE PLOTS WAS
TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS
FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP
WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED
TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZED
FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS.

6. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT
JOHN ROSELLI ^{USED} ~~QUOTED~~ THE FACTS OF
THE CIA-ORGANIZED ^{CRIME} ~~CONSPIRACY~~ ^{PLOTS} TO
FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY
IN EFFORTS TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION
IN LEGAL MATTERS.